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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 A federal jury convicted Appellant George Georgiou 
(“Appellant” or “Georgiou”) of conspiracy, securities fraud, 
and wire fraud for his participation in planned manipulation 
of the markets of four publicly traded stocks, resulting in 
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more than $55,000,000 in actual losses.  The District Court 
sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment, ordered him to 
pay restitution of $55,823,398 and ordered that he pay a 
special assessment of $900.  The Court also subjected 
Georgiou to forfeiture of $26,000,000.  
 For the first time on appeal, Georgiou argues that 
under Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010), his securities and wire fraud convictions were 
improperly based upon the extraterritorial application of 
United States law.  Thus, we must determine as a matter of 
first impression whether the purchases and sales of securities 
issued by U.S. companies through U.S. market makers acting 
as intermediaries for foreign entities constitute “domestic 
transactions” under Morrison.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we find that these transactions are “domestic 
transactions,” and that his conviction was not based upon the 
improper extraterritorial application of United States law.  
Georgiou also argues that the District Court erred in denying 
his motion for a new trial based on purported Brady and 
Jencks Act violations.  He also asserts that the District Court 
erred on several evidentiary and sentencing issues.  We find 
no error. Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s Judgment 
of Conviction.  
I.  
A. Factual Background 
 From 2004 through 2008, Georgiou and his 
co-conspirators engaged in a stock fraud scheme resulting in 
more than $55 million in actual losses.  The scheme centered 
on manipulating the markets of four stocks: Neutron 
Enterprises, Inc. (“Neutron”), Avicena Group, Inc. 
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(“Avicena”), Hydrogen Hybrid Technologies, Inc. 
(“HYHY”), and Northern Ethanol, Inc. (“Northern Ethanol”) 
(collectively, “Target Stocks”).  At all relevant times, the 
Target Stocks were quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board 
(“OTCBB”)1 or the Pink OTC Markets Inc. (“Pink Sheets”).2 
 In order to facilitate their scheme, Georgiou and his 
co-conspirators opened brokerage accounts in Canada, the 
Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos.  Once opened, the 
co-conspirators used these accounts to engage in manipulative 
trading in the Target Stocks.  Specifically, by trading stocks 
between the various accounts they controlled, the 
co-conspirators artificially inflated the stock prices and 
                                                
1 The OTCBB is “[a]n interdealer quotation system for 
unlisted, over-the-counter securities. The OTC Bulletin Board 
or ‘OTCBB’ allows Market Makers to display firm prices for 
domestic securities, foreign securities, and [American 
Depository Receipts] that can be updated on a real-time 
basis.”  OTCBB Glossary, Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparen
cy/OTCBB/Glossary/P126264 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).   
2 The Pink Sheets, now known as OTC Market Group Inc., is 
“an electronic inter-dealer quotation system that displays 
quotes from broker-dealers for many over-the-counter (OTC) 
securities.”  OTC Link LLC, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/pink.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015). 
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created the false impression that there was an active market in 
each Target Stock.   
 As a result of this manipulation, Georgiou and his 
co-conspirators were able to sell their shares at inflated 
prices.  In addition, these artificially inflated shares would be 
used as collateral to fraudulently borrow funds on margin and 
obtain millions of dollars in loans from Caledonia Corporate 
Management Group Limited (“Caledonia”) and Accuvest 
Limited (“Accuvest”), both brokerage firms based in the 
Bahamas.  Eventually, these accounts experienced severe 
trading losses since the assets purportedly serving as 
collateral proved to be worthless.3   
 In June 2006, unbeknownst to Georgiou, Kevin 
Waltzer,4 one of his co-conspirators, began cooperating in an 
FBI sting operation.  Through Waltzer’s cooperation, the FBI 
monitored Georgiou’s activities, including many of his 
emails, phone calls and wire transfers. 
                                                
3 Indeed, Caledonia was forced to liquidate its business, 
resulting in approximately $25 million in losses.  These losses 
were sustained by the firm’s clients, many of whom lost their 
entire retirement savings.  
4 Waltzer pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, one count of 
mail fraud, and one count of money laundering, pursuant to a 
written plea agreement.  He was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 132 months, followed by a term of 
supervised release, and ordered to pay $40,675,241.55 in 
restitution.   
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 1.  Georgiou’s Four Manipulation    
  Schemes: Neutron, Avicena,    
  HYHY, and Northern Ethanol  
 Georgiou and his co-conspirators manipulated the 
prices of the Target Stocks by creating matched trades,5 wash 
sales,6 and misleading email blasts.  They used various alias 
accounts, nominees, and offshore brokerage accounts to 
conceal both their ownership of the Target Stocks and their 
involvement in the fraudulent scheme.   
 At least some of the manipulative trades were 
transacted through market makers7 located in the United 
                                                
5 “A ‘matched trade’ is an order to buy or sell securities that 
is entered with knowledge that a matching order on the 
opposite side of the transaction has been or will be entered for 
the purpose of: (1) creating a false or misleading appearance 
of active trading in any publicly traded security; or (2) 
creating a false or misleading appearance with respect to the 
market for any such security.”  (Indictment ¶ 9.) 
6 “A ‘wash sale’ is an order to buy or sell securities resulting 
in no change of beneficial ownership for the purpose of: (1) 
creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in 
any publicly traded security; or (2) creating a false or 
misleading appearance with respect to the market for any 
such security.”  (Indictment ¶ 10.) 
7 “A market maker is a firm that facilitates trading in a stock, 
provides quotes [for] both a buy and sell price for a stock, and 
potentially profits from the price spread.”  (Indictment ¶ 33.); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(38) (A “market maker means any 
specialist permitted to act as a dealer . . . and any dealer who, 
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States.  Georgiou communicated via phone and e-mail with 
Waltzer about their plans, and also had occasional in-person 
meetings with Waltzer and others in the United States about 
these schemes.  In these communications, Georgiou provided 
direction on how to implement the manipulative schemes, and 
demonstrated his role and culpability in orchestrating and 
perpetrating the fraud.  After fourteen months, Georgiou 
wired $5,000 to the account of an undercover FBI agent as 
part of a test transaction.  Six days later, Georgiou was 
arrested.   
 2.  The Caledonia Fraud 
 In December 2006, Georgiou opened a margin-eligible 
account in his wife’s name at Caledonia.  As a result, 
Georgiou was able to obtain loans and purchase stock without 
using his own funds.  Georgiou represented to the principals 
at Caledonia that the margin in his account would be 
collateralized by approximately $15 million worth of Avicena 
and Neutron stock, but did not disclose that the value of these 
securities had been artificially inflated.  
 In March 2007, Georgiou borrowed approximately 
$3,394,000 from Caledonia to purchase 1,697,000 shares of 
Avicena from Waltzer.  That loan was secured by Avicena 
and Neutron stock held in the name of Georgiou’s wife at 
another brokerage firm, and was never repaid.   
                                                                                                           
with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering 
quotations in an inter-dealer communications system or 
otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such security for 
his own account on a regular or continuous basis.”)    
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 During the same month, Georgiou borrowed 
approximately $2.8 million from Caledonia to purchase 
Neutron stock and to provide financing to Neutron.  The loan 
was ostensibly secured by Avicena and Neutron stock held in 
a different name at another brokerage firm.  This loan was 
also never repaid.  Caledonia was unable to cover the 
substantial deficits incurred as a result of Georgiou’s 
activities.  Ultimately, Caledonia suffered approximately $25 
million in losses.  The firm was later dissolved and liquidated. 
 3. The Accuvest Fraud  
 In June 2007, Georgiou met with representatives of 
Accuvest in the Bahamas to discuss opening a brokerage 
account.  In September 2007, Georgiou opened an account at 
Accuvest in a different name.  The trading in the account was 
handled through William Wright Associates (“Wright”), an 
Accuvest affiliate based in California.  From October 2007 
through February 2008, Georgiou deposited HYHY and 
Northern Ethanol stock into this account, and in return, 
Accuvest provided a margin loan of ten percent of the value 
of the account.  Georgiou did not disclose that the value of 
these securities had been artificially inflated.  On several 
occasions in 2008, Georgiou directed Wright, via email, to 
wire cash from this account to Avicena, or Team One 
Marketing, a Canadian company associated with Georgiou. 
 In August 2008, Georgiou instructed Wright to open a 
second Accuvest account, which was funded with 10 million 
shares of Northern Ethanol.  As had happened before, 
Georgiou did not disclose that the value of these securities 
had been artificially inflated.  Georgiou failed to repay the 
money that he had borrowed on margin and in cash loans 
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from Accuvest.  The artificially inflated stock did not cover 
the loans and Accuvest lost at least $4 million.   
B. Procedural History  
 Following a three-week trial, a jury found Georgiou 
guilty of one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
371, four counts of securities fraud, in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, and four counts of wire fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349.   
 Georgiou was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment, 
and ordered to pay over $55 million in restitution.    
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 
78aa and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
III.  
A. Extraterritorial Effect of United States Securities 
 Law 
 1. Standard of Review   
 For the first time on appeal, Georgiou argues that his 
securities fraud convictions are improperly based on an 
exterritorial application of United States law.  He asserts that 
without proof that any securities transactions occurred in the 
United States, the jury lacked sufficient evidence upon which 
to convict him.  He further asserts that the District Court erred 
in failing to require that the jury base it verdicts solely on 
10 
 
domestic transactions.  Georgiou relies on Morrison, which 
held that Section 10(b) of the Act only proscribes “deceptive 
conduct [made] ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered.’”  561 U.S. at 266 (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b)).   
 Because Georgiou raised neither argument below, we 
review for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Henderson v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124-25 (2013); United States 
v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2010).8  A finding of 
“plain error” is warranted if: “(1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the 
error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 
dispute’; (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial 
rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.’”  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 
                                                
8 Although Morrison was decided after Georgiou’s trial, the 
standard of review remains the same.  See Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“[A] new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not 
yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”); see also United 
States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Plain error 
review applies equally where the defendant did not object 
before the trial court because he failed to recognize an error, 
and where the defendant did not object because the trial 
court’s decision was correct at the time but assertedly became 
erroneous due to a supervening legal decision.”); United 
States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1487 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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258, 262 (2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 
135 (2009)); see also United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 
517 (3d Cir. 2012).  Georgiou bears the burden of showing 
that the error affected his substantial rights.  Andrews, 681 
F.3d at 517. 
 2. Morrison and Extraterritoriality  
 Georgiou was convicted of securities fraud pursuant to 
Section 10(b) of the Act and Section 10(b)’s implementing 
regulation, SEC Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”).  15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff 
(prescribing penalties for willful violations of the Act).  
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful: 
 [t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).9  
                                                
9 Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b), makes it 
unlawful “for any person . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . or (c) [t]o engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.”  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b–5. “Rule 10b-5 . . . was promulgated under 
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 The Supreme Court has limited the application of 
Section 10(b) to actors who employ “manipulative or 
deceptive device[s]” in two contexts: (1) transactions 
involving “the purchase or sale of a security listed on an 
American stock exchange,” and (2) transactions involving 
“the purchase or sale of any other security in the United 
States.”  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.  Indeed, Section 10(b) 
has no extraterritorial reach.  Id. at 262, 266-67 (determining 
that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 had no extraterritorial 
effect in civil context); see also Vilar, 729 F.3d at 74 (making 
the same determination in the criminal context, reasoning that 
“[a] statute either applies extraterritorially or it does not”).  
Thus, we consider here whether any of the relevant 
transactions Georgiou is charged with have the requisite 
nexus to the United States under Morrison to subject him to 
liability under Section 10(b). 
 It is undisputed that the Target Stocks were listed or 
traded on the OTCBB or Pink Sheets.  However, whether the 
OTCBB or the Pink Sheets constitute “national securities 
exchange[s]” under Morrison, and whether the securities at 
issue were purchased or sold in the United States, are both 
disputed.10  The Supreme Court has not addressed either issue 
                                                                                                           
§ 10(b), and ‘does not extend beyond conduct encompassed 
by § 10(b)’s prohibition.’”  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261-62 
(quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 
(1997)). 
10 The Indictment defines the Pink Sheets as “an inter-dealer 
electronic quotation and trading system in the over-the-
counter (‘OTC’) securities market,” (Indictment ¶ 2) and 
provides no definition of the OTCBB.  The Indictment further 
states that “[t]he United States Securities and Exchange 
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in this context, i.e., whether a foreign entity’s purchase of 
securities listed on the OTCBB or Pink Sheets through 
American market makers ought be considered a “domestic 
transaction” for the purposes of Section 10(b). 
  a. “National Securities Exchange” 
 Under the first prong of Morrison, Section 10(b) 
applies to “the purchase or sale of a security listed on an 
American stock exchange.”  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.  
Securities listed on the OTCBB and the Pink Sheets are not 
within these parameters.  According to the SEC, there are 
eighteen registered national security exchanges; the Pink 
Sheets and the OTCBB are not among them.11  See SEC 
                                                                                                           
Commission (the ‘SEC’) was an independent agency of the 
United States which was charged by law with protecting 
investors by regulating and monitoring, among other things, 
the purchase and sale of publicly traded securities, including 
securities traded on the Pink Sheets and the OTCBB.  Federal 
securities laws prohibited fraud in connection with the 
purchase and sale of securities . . .” (Indictment ¶ 8.) 
11 Indeed, the OTCBB is, by definition, a quotation service for 
“securities which are not listed or traded on NASDAQ or any 
other national securities exchange.”  OTCBB Frequently 
Asked Questions, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/O
TCBB/FAQ/index.htm (“OTCBB FAQ”) (emphasis added) 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  Likewise, the Pink Sheets may 
include securities that “[have] been delisted from an 
exchange.”  Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.otcmarkets.com/learn/otc101-faq (last visited Jan. 
5, 2015).  Unlike companies listed on a national securities 
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Website, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml 
(hereinafter “SEC Webpage on National Securities 
Exchanges”) (last visited Jan. 5, 2015); see also 15 U.S.C.           
§ 78f(b) (requiring that exchanges register with the SEC and 
comply with various requirements to constitute a “national 
securities exchange”). 
 Further, the stated purpose of the Act refers to 
“securities exchanges” and “over-the-counter markets” 
separately, which suggests that one is not inclusive of the 
other.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., (described as “[a]n Act [t]o 
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of 
over-the-counter markets . . . [and] to prevent inequitable and 
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets”) (emphasis 
added).   
 Given that a “national securities exchange” is 
explicitly listed in Section 10(b)—to the exclusion of the 
OTC markets—and coupled with the absence of the Pink 
Sheets and the OTCBB on the list of registered national 
security exchanges on the SEC Webpage on Exchanges, we 
                                                                                                           
exchange, those quoted on the OTCBB and the Pink Sheets 
are not subject to “listing and maintenance standards, which 
are stringently monitored and enforced . . . . [and do not] have 
reporting obligations to the market.”  OTCBB FAQ.   
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are persuaded that those exchanges are not national securities 
exchanges within the scope of Morrison.12   
  b. Domestic Transactions in Securities  
   not Listed on Domestic Exchanges 
 In this case, foreign entities purchased and sold 
securities quoted on the OTCBB and the Pink Sheets.  Several 
of these purchases were executed by market makers operating 
within the United States.  In contrast, the Court in Morrison 
considered a “foreign cubed action . . . in which (1) foreign 
plaintiffs [were] suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American 
court for violations of American securities laws based on 
securities transactions in (3) foreign countries.”  Morrison, 
561 U.S. at 283 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).13  In that case, all aspects 
                                                
12 But see SEC v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (“hold[ing] that Morrison does not bar the 
territorial application of § 10(b) to manipulative trading on 
the domestic over-the-counter market”); see also United 
States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(securities traded on the OTCBB or Pink Sheets “meet[] 
Morrison’s requirement for a U.S. nexus”).  
13 In Morrison, Australian investors purchased shares of an 
Australian bank whose stock shares were listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange Limited.  561 U.S. at 251-52.  In 
1998, the Australian bank purchased an American mortgage 
servicing company and for three years touted the success of 
the American company’s business in its annual reports and 
public documents and statements.  Id. at 251-52.  But in 2001, 
the Australian bank wrote down the value of the American 
company’s assets by more than $2 billion, which resulted in a 
16 
 
of the trades at issue occurred abroad, and thus, it was 
determined that Section 10(b) did not apply.  There are two 
key distinctions between Morrison and the instant case: (1) 
the transactions in this case involve stocks of U.S. companies, 
(2) that were executed through American market makers. 
 To determine whether the transactions at issue were 
“domestic transactions,” under Morrison, id. at 267, we 
consider “not . . . the place where the deception originated, 
but [the place where] purchases and sales of securities” 
occurred.  Id. at 266.  It is the “location of the transaction that 
establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the [Security 
Exchange] Act’s inapplicability.”  Id. at 268.  
 Several of our sister circuits interpret this to mean that 
“a securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur 
irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction within the 
United States or when title is passed within the United 
States.”  Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd v. Ficeto, 
677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Quail Cruise Ship 
Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens, 645 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 
(11th Cir. 2011) (allegation that closing in Florida 
precipitated transfer of title sufficient to satisfy Morrison at 
motion to dismiss); SEC v. Levine, 462 Fed. App’x 717, 719 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Securities Act governs the [] sales 
because the actual sales closed in Nevada when [a defendant] 
received completed stock purchase agreements and 
payments.”); United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1300 
                                                                                                           
drop in the value of the Australian bank’s stock.  Id. at 252. 
The Australian investors sued the bank in the Southern 
District of New York alleging violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a).  Id. at 253-54.   
17 
 
(11th Cir. 2013) (fund at issue “was ‘run out of New York 
City’ and [] [defendant’s] office was located in Florida, which 
support[] the inference that the [] [f]und purchased the 
securities in the United States.”)  
  We agree that “‘[c]ommitment’ is a simple and direct 
way of designating the point at which . . . the parties obligated 
themselves to perform what they had agreed to perform even 
if the formal performance of their agreement is to be after a 
lapse of time.’” Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 68 (quoting 
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 891 
(2d Cir. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
“the point of irrevocable liability can be used to determine the 
locus of a securities purchase or sale.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
territoriality under Morrison turns on “where, physically, the 
purchaser or seller committed him or herself” to pay for or 
deliver a security.  Vilar, 729 F.3d at 77 n.11.  
 Facts that demonstrate “irrevocable liability” include 
the “formation of the contracts, the placement of purchase 
orders, the passing of title, or the exchange of money.”  
Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 69, 70; see also Vilar, 729 F.3d 
at 78.14  In Vilar, the Second Circuit concluded that Section 
10(b) applied where: (1) some victims entered into 
investment agreements in the United States; (2) another 
                                                
14 On the other hand, heavy marketing in the United States, a 
party’s residency or citizenship, and the fact that the 
deception may have originated in the United States were 
insufficient to support a Section 10(b) claim.  Absolute 
Activist, 677 F.3d at 70.   
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victim “executed the documents necessary to invest . . . in her 
own New York apartment and handed those documents to a 
New York messenger”; and (3) one victim sent the money 
required for opening her account from New York.  729 F.3d 
at 76-78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).     
 Here, at least one of the fraudulent transactions in each 
of the Target Stocks was bought and sold through U.S.-based 
market makers.  Government witness and SEC employee 
Daniel Koster testified that all of the manipulative trades were 
“facilitate[d]” by U.S.-based market makers, i.e., an 
American market maker bought the stock from the seller and 
sold it to the buyer.  (App. 1890-96, 1904-05, 1968); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(38).  Therefore, some of the relevant 
transactions required the involvement of a purchaser or seller 
working with a market maker and committing to a transaction 
in the United States, incurring irrevocable liability in the 
United States, or passing title in the United States.  The 
record also contains evidence of specific instances in which 
the Target Stocks were bought or sold at Georgiou’s direction 
from entities located in the United States.15    
                                                
15 For instance: (1) on November 3, 2005, Waltzer, who was 
located in Pennsylvania, sold 69,150 shares of Neutron stock 
from one of his accounts to another of his accounts; (2) on 
May 9, 2006, from within the United States, Waltzer sold 
100,000 shares of Avicena stock from one of his accounts to 
another of his; (3) Georgiou deposited 2.5 million HYHY 
shares into an account in California; (4) on September 3, 
2008, an undercover FBI agent purchased 16,000 shares of 
Northern Ethanol stock from within the United States; and (5) 
Georgiou wired $5,000 to a bank account in Philadelphia for 
19 
 
 We now hold that irrevocable liability establishes the 
location of a securities transaction.  Here, the evidence is 
sufficient to demonstrate that Georgiou engaged in “domestic 
transactions” under the second prong of Morrison, i.e., 
transactions involving “the purchase or sale of any [] security 
in the United States.”  See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.  Thus, 
the District Court’s application of Section 10(b) to 
Georgiou’s transactions was proper. 
  c. Jury Instructions  
 Georgiou argues that under the District Court’s 
instructions, all four of the securities fraud counts may have 
been based exclusively on foreign margin loan transactions.  
However, Georgiou fails to demonstrate that the jury relied 
on a legally insufficient theory.  The District Court’s jury 
instructions track the statutory language of Rule 10b-5.  See 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2002).  
“[T]he longstanding rule [is] that general verdicts will stand 
even if one of the possible grounds for conviction was 
unsupported by the evidence.”  Id. at 145.  The “‘invalid legal 
theory’ exception” to this rule applies “if the indictment or 
the district court’s jury instructions are based on an erroneous 
interpretation of law or contain a mistaken description of the 
law.”  Id.  Here, there was no such deficiency in the 
instruction. 
                                                                                                           
the undercover FBI agent, in furtherance of the manipulative 
trading scheme.  
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 Further, the District Court properly instructed the jury 
on the elements of securities fraud pursuant to Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, including the jurisdictional elements relating 
to conduct in the United States.  (App. 2972-73) (requiring 
the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant 
used or caused to be used the facilities of a national securities 
exchange or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct”).  The 
District Court was not required to preclude the jury from 
considering foreign activity in evaluating the evidence. 
Furthermore, Georgiou’s fraudulent activity in the United 
States is not rendered lawful because some transactions 
occurred outside of the United States or because some victims 
are located in foreign countries. 
B. Extraterritoriality of United States Wire Fraud 
 Statute  
 Appellant also argues that his wire fraud convictions 
are improperly based on the extraterritorial application of 
United States law, and that these convictions are legally 
insufficient because the Government failed to demonstrate 
that his conduct violated foreign law.  As Georgiou raises this 
argument for the first time on appeal, we apply plain error 
review.  Henderson, 133 S.Ct. at 1124.   
 Unlike securities fraud, the statute governing wire 
fraud “prohibits ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud,’—fraud 
simpliciter, without any requirement that it be ‘in connection 
with’ any particular transaction or event.”  Morrison, 561 
U.S. at 271-72 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343).  Thus, a wire 
fraud offense is “complete the moment [a party] executed the 
scheme inside the United States. . . .”  Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005).  Moreover, unlike the 
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Securities Exchange Act, Section 1343 applies 
extraterritorially.  Id. at 371-72.  Indeed, the explicit statutory 
language indicates that “it punishes frauds executed in 
‘interstate or foreign commerce,’” and “is surely not a statute 
in which Congress had only domestic concerns in mind.”  Id. 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343). 
 Here, the record contains ample evidence that 
Georgiou used interstate wires to effect a “scheme or artifice 
to defraud.”  18 U.S.C. §1343.  Georgiou regularly used e-
mail to direct Waltzer’s participation in the fraud and wired 
money from a Canadian bank to an undercover FBI agent’s 
account in Pennsylvania.  (See, e.g., App. 3800-04, 3778-82, 
3930-34, 4019.)   
 In addition, Appellant’s argument that Pasquantino 
requires the Government to prove that Georgiou’s conduct 
was illegal in the Bahamas fails.  The footnote that Georgiou 
relies on in Pasquantino references foreign tax law for the 
sole purpose of determining whether the victim had “valuable 
property interests as defined by foreign law.”  544 U.S. at 371 
n.13.  Here, it is undisputed that the foreign victims had a 
property interest in the money and property that Georgiou 
fraudulently obtained from them.  Hence, the wire fraud 
statute is properly applied. 
 Finally, Georgiou’s arguments that the District Court 
erred because it did not require the jury to limit its 
consideration to domestic transactions only and permitted the 
jury to consider invalid legal theories, also fail with respect to 
wire fraud.  As discussed, the text of the relevant statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, does not expressly require that a verdict be 
based on entirely domestic transactions.  Pasquantino, 544 
U.S. at 372-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Instead, the 
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statute’s only jurisdictional requirement is that a 
communication be transmitted through interstate or foreign 
commerce for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud.  
18 U.S.C. § 1343.   
 The District Court properly instructed the jury on this 
issue, explaining that interstate or foreign commerce is “to 
send from one state to another, or to or from the United 
States . . . .”  (App. 2985.)  This instruction did not 
impermissibly allow the jury to convict Georgiou based 
solely on foreign activity.  Thus, the District Court did not err 
with respect to its jury instruction on wire fraud. 
 Georgiou’s argument that the jury may have relied on 
a legally invalid theory also fails.  Here, the District Court’s 
instructions on the elements of wire fraud were proper, and 
the evidence was sufficient to convict on the market 
manipulation theory.  Thus, the jury was not presented with a 
legally invalid theory of guilt, and the District Court did not 
err.  
C. Violations of Brady and Jencks Act Disclosure              
 Requirements  
 Georgiou contends that the Government suppressed 
evidence concerning cooperating witness Kevin Waltzer’s 
history of mental illness and substance abuse, as well as 
statements Waltzer made to the SEC, in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500.   
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 1. Brady Violations 
 “Our review of the denial of a motion for new trial on 
the basis of a Brady argument is de novo with respect to the 
district court’s conclusions of law and is based on the ‘clearly 
erroneous’ standard with respect to its findings of fact.”  
United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  Under Brady, the Government is required, upon 
request, to produce “evidence favorable to an accused.”  373 
U.S. at 87.  The failure to do so will result in a due process 
violation if the suppressed evidence “is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution.”  Id.  To establish a Brady violation, a 
defendant must demonstrate that: “‘(1) evidence was 
suppressed; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the 
defense; and (3) the suppressed evidence was material either 
to guilt or to punishment.’”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 
197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 132 
F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir.1997)).  
 Evidence is favorable if it is impeaching or 
exculpatory.  Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); 
Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013).  “The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome” of the trial.  United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 441-54 (1995).  Thus,  
“[t]he materiality of Brady material depends 
almost entirely on the value of the evidence 
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relative to the other evidence mustered by the 
state.”  Suppressed evidence that would be 
cumulative of other evidence or would be used 
to impeach testimony of a witness whose 
account is strongly corroborated is generally not 
considered material for Brady purposes.  
Conversely, however, undisclosed evidence that 
would seriously undermine the testimony of a 
key witness may be considered material when it 
relates to an essential issue or the testimony 
lacks strong corroboration. 
Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129 (quoting Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 
387, 396-97 (5th Cir. 2010)).   
 Georgiou argues that the Government suppressed 
Waltzer’s bail report (“Bail Report”) and the minutes from 
Waltzer’s arraignment and guilty plea (“Minutes”).  Both the 
Bail Report and the Minutes contain evidence of Waltzer’s 
cocaine use and mental health history.  Specifically, the Bail 
Report references Waltzer’s history of treatment for 
psychiatric disorders and substance abuse.  The Minutes 
include Waltzer’s statements about his treatment for 
depression and anxiety and his use of Paxil, a prescription 
medication, to treat those conditions.   
  a. Waltzer’s Substance Abuse 
 Georgiou argues that the Government failed to disclose 
evidence of Waltzer’s substance abuse in the Minutes and the 
Bail Report in violation of its Brady obligations.  However, 
Appellant received statements concerning Waltzer’s drug use 
in the Government’s pretrial production, including notes 
showing a statement from Waltzer that he “did drugs and 
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drank alcohol . . . and developed an addiction to cocaine . . . 
[and] last used cocaine six months ago.”  (Supp. App. 1338.)  
Indeed, Waltzer testified on direct and cross-examination 
about his cocaine use. (App. 502-04, 848-49.) Thus, 
additional evidence of his substance abuse would have been 
cumulative.  Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129; see also United States 
v. Barraza Cazares, 465 F.3d 327, 335 (8th Cir. 2006) (no 
Brady violation where “all that was unknown to the defendant 
and his attorney was the fact of Lopez’s statement, not the 
content of that statement”).  Because evidence of Waltzer’s 
substance abuse was provided to Appellant prior to trial, this 
material was not suppressed, and the first prong of Brady is 
not satisfied.  
 Moreover, assuming arguendo that evidence of 
Waltzer’s former drug use had been suppressed, such 
evidence is not favorable to the Appellant for purposes of our 
Brady analysis.  At trial, Waltzer testified that his cocaine use 
did not impact his ability to understand, remember or testify 
about his interactions with Appellant. (App. 503.) Appellant 
chose not to probe this issue more fully on cross-examination. 
(App. 848-49.)  There is no evidence—in the pretrial 
discovery, trial testimony, Minutes, or Bail Report—to 
suggest that Waltzer’s former substance abuse impacted the 
reliability of his testimony.  Thus, because this evidence 
neither constitutes impeachment nor exculpatory material, it 
is not favorable to the Appellant.  
 Finally, evidence of Waltzer’s substance abuse cannot 
be deemed material because there is not a “reasonable 
probability” that this evidence would have changed the 
outcome of the trial.  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 454.  Indeed, evidence of Waltzer’s substance 
abuse was considered at trial on both direct and cross-
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examination.  To the extent Appellant argues that additional 
information about the intensity or duration of Waltzer’s 
substance abuse may have impacted the trial’s outcome, he 
explains neither why he did not probe these issues more fully 
on cross examination, nor why such new information would 
have changed the trial’s outcome when the substance abuse 
evidence that was set out at trial did not.  Thus, it cannot be 
deemed material.  
 Because evidence of Waltzer’s substance abuse in the 
Minutes and the Bail Report was neither suppressed, 
favorable nor material, Appellant’s Brady arguments 
concerning this evidence must fail. 
  b. Waltzer’s Mental Health History and  
      Treatment 
 Georgiou also argues that information regarding 
Waltzer’s mental health was suppressed in both the Bail 
Report and the Minutes.  In the Minutes, Waltzer stated that 
he had seen a mental health provider for depression and 
anxiety, and was taking Paxil for depression.  However, in 
response to questioning from the court, he agreed that his 
“head [has] always been clear,” and that his medication did 
not affect “how [he] think[s].”  (App. 4249-50, 4245, 4355.)  
The Bail Report also includes information that Waltzer had 
“been diagnosed in the past with Anxiety Disorder, Panic 
Disorder and Substance Abuse Disorder.”  (App. 4187.) 
 The Minutes and Bail Report were not suppressed 
under the first prong of Brady because they were accessible to 
Appellant.  “Brady does not oblige the [G]overnment to 
provide defendants with evidence that they could obtain from 
other sources by exercising reasonable diligence.”  Perdomo, 
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929 F.2d at 973.  Indeed, Appellant “was in a position of 
parity with the government as far as access to this material,” 
United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1994), and 
thus, “the transcript [] was as available to [the defendant] as it 
was to the Government.”  United States v. Ladoucer, 573 
F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding no Brady violation 
from the government’s failure to produce the transcript of its 
witness’s state court testimony in an unrelated matter because 
the defendant “could have obtained a copy of the transcript 
himself”).   
 Here, as the District Court observed, “it is apparent 
that with just minimal due diligence on the part of Georgiou, 
he could have obtained a copy of [Waltzer’s] guilty plea 
transcript because he certainly was aware that the main 
witness against him had pled guilty before Judge Dalzell.”  
(App. 58.)  Likewise, the existence of the Bail Report was not 
hidden from Appellant, and it could have been accessed 
through his exercise of reasonable diligence.  Accordingly, 
the Minutes and the Bail Report cannot be deemed to have 
been suppressed.  
 Further, evidence concerning Waltzer’s mental health 
is neither favorable to the Appellant nor material.  In this 
case, this evidence neither undermines Waltzer’s reliability 
nor calls into question his “‘ability to perceive, remember and 
narrate perceptions accurately,’” and thus is not “clearly 
relevant to his credibility.”  Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 
666 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. 
Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)); see also 4 
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal 
Evidence § 607.05[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 
2014) (“A witness’s credibility may always be attacked by 
showing that his or her capacity to observe, remember, or 
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narrate is impaired.  Consequently, the witness’s capacity at 
the time of the event, as well as at the time of trial, is 
significant.”).   
 The evidence at issue here shows that Waltzer had 
been seeking medical attention for anxiety and depression for 
several years, and had been taking medication to treat those 
conditions.  (App. 4187.)  In the Minutes, Waltzer stated that 
his medication did not affect his mental capacity, and the 
District Judge, the Government, and Waltzer’s attorney all 
agreed he was competent to plead guilty.  (App. 4250.)  Cf. 
Wilson, 589 F. 3d at 666 (suppressing mental health evidence 
found material under Brady where it showed that witness had 
“an inability to form adequate perceptions, that he is easily 
confused, has dissociative tendencies, blackouts, motor visual 
problems, weak long and short term memory, poor judgment, 
and distorted perceptions of reality.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Furthermore, evidence of Waltzer’s mental 
illness was not material because, relative to the strength of the 
evidence against Appellant, there is not a “reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
  c. Documents from SEC Meetings with  
        Waltzer 
 Georgiou also argues that the Government violated 
Brady in failing to produce documents from meetings 
between the SEC and Waltzer.  The Government produced 
pretrial discovery from the SEC, including trading and 
financial records of the Target Stocks.  Subsequent to this 
production, Georgiou withdrew his discovery motion as moot. 
(Supp. App. 1228.)  However, the Government had not 
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produced notes taken during two SEC interviews of Waltzer, 
at which members of the prosecution team were present. 
Subsequent to Appellant’s posttrial challenge, the 
Government reviewed these notes and determined that they 
did not contain any Brady material.  
 We agree with the District Court’s assessment that 
there is no basis in the record to suggest that these notes 
contained Brady material.  Pure speculation that exculpatory 
information might exist is insufficient to sustain a Brady 
claim.  See United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 843 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (“‘Mere speculation that a government file may 
contain Brady material is not sufficient to require a remand 
for in camera inspection, much less reversal for a new 
trial.’”) (quoting United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984)).  Thus, 
Appellant has not set out a viable Brady claim based on these 
documents. 
*** 
 In light of the extensive evidence in the trial record, 
including recordings of Appellant discussing fraudulent 
activities, emails between Appellant and co-conspirators 
regarding manipulative trades, voluminous records of the 
trades themselves, bank accounts and wire transfers, 
Appellant’s argument that the evidence of Walter’s substance 
abuse and mental illness, or his meetings with the SEC, is 
material for our Brady analysis cannot stand.  Waltzer’s 
testimony is “strongly corroborated” by recordings of phone 
calls and meetings, and records of actual trades.  See Johnson, 
705 F.3d at 129 (citing Rocha, 619 F.3d at 396-97).  Thus, 
this evidence would “generally not [be] considered material 
for Brady purposes” because when considered “‘relative to 
30 
 
the other evidence mustered by the state,’” the allegedly 
suppressed evidence is insignificant.  Id. (quoting Rocha, 619 
F.3d at 396).  Moreover, for the foregoing reasons, the 
evidence at issue had not been suppressed, nor is it favorable 
to the Appellant.  As such, Appellant’s Brady arguments must 
fail.   
 2. Jencks Act Disclosures 
 The Jencks Act obliges the Government to disclose 
any witness statement “in the possession of the United States 
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has 
testified.”  18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).  This requirement is limited 
to production of statements “possessed by the prosecutorial 
arm of the federal government.”  United States v. Reyeros, 
537 F.3d 270, 285 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. 
Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2003)).  However, unlike 
Brady, “[t]he Jencks Act requires that any statement in the 
possession of the government—exculpatory or not—that is 
made by a government witness must be produced by the 
government during trial.”  United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 
256, 263 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 Here, Appellant has failed to identify any statements 
that were withheld in violation of the Jencks Act.  Indeed, 
Appellant does not dispute that the Government produced 
boxes of impeachment evidence concerning Waltzer, 
including records of Waltzer’s numerous prior frauds, 
evidence of his plea and cooperation, trading and financial 
records, and prior statements to law enforcement.  The 
additional statements Appellant seeks either were not within 
the possession of the prosecutorial arm of the government, 
i.e., those held by the SEC, or do not exist.  Likewise, the 
Government did not have possession of the Bail Report, and 
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thus was not obligated to provide it.  (See App. 108-09.) (the 
Government explained that it neither examined nor took 
possession of the Bail Report, and the Report included 
language indicating that it should not be removed from the 
courtroom.)  
D.  Evidentiary Rulings 
 1. Koster’s Testimony and Summary Charts  
 After the jury returned its verdict, Georgiou moved for 
a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that Government witness 
Daniel Koster, an SEC employee, should not have been 
permitted to testify as a lay witness under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 701.  The District Court denied this motion on the 
grounds that Koster’s testimony was permissible under Rule 
701.   
 On appeal, Georgiou again argues that the District 
Court erred by allowing Koster to testify as an undeclared 
expert and to offer opinions and legal conclusions that 
usurped the role of the jury.  He also argues that the District 
Court admitted prejudicial charts into evidence without 
providing cautionary instructions to the jury.  The 
Government responds that these arguments have been 
waived,16 and lack merit.   
                                                
16 The Government submitted a trial memorandum, including 
the following stipulations reached by the parties: (1) 
“[v]arious trading records and financial evidence relating to 
the scheme will be introduced in the form of summary charts 
and testimony pursuant to Rule 1006”; (2) Koster would 
“present testimony and accompanying charts concerning the 
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 We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 
189 (3d Cir. 2003).  “‘An abuse of discretion arises when the 
District Court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law[,] or an improper 
application of law to fact.’”  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re TMI Litig., 193 
F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
                                                                                                           
manipulative trading activity charged in the indictment”; and 
(3) Koster may further testify as a “summary fact witness to 
explain the relevance of his trading analysis to the other 
evidence presented in the case.”  (App. 5593-94.)  Georgiou 
objected generally to the use of a summary witness, and to the 
use of witnesses and charts to summarize anything other than 
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs, specifically 
objecting to summary of oral testimony.   
 However, Georgiou did not dispute that the “charts and 
the underlying records have been produced to defendant” and 
that “defendant has stipulated that [they] are authentic and 
qualify as business records under Rule 803(6).”  (Id. at 5594.)  
Before trial, Georgiou’s counsel indicated that he had 
concerns about the proposed testimony of the Government’s 
SEC witnesses and would be objecting if they “stray[ed] from 
within [] legal limits,” specifically identifying “the issue of 
opinion testimony or improper summary of things not 
admissible in evidence.”  Id. at 1520.  However, counsel also 
stated his concerns with the charts had been “resolved.”  Id.  
Furthermore, at trial, no objections were lodged by Appellant 
with respect to Koster’s testimony, or the admission of charts.  
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 “A new trial should be ordered only when substantial 
prejudice has occurred,” United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 
29, 49 (3d Cir. 1975), and “if the interest of justice so 
requires.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.  To grant a new trial, a court 
must determine that “the allegedly improper statements or 
conduct make it ‘reasonably probable’ that the verdict was 
influenced by the resulting prejudice.”  Forrest v. Beloit 
Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Greenleaf v. 
Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
 “We review the District Court’s decisions as to the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  To the 
extent that these rulings were based on an interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, however, our review is plenary.”  
United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n. 14 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d 
Cir.1992)). 
 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, if a witness does 
not testify as an expert, opinion testimony must be: “(a) 
rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to 
clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701.   
 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, a party may 
“use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of 
voluminous writings [or] recordings . . . that cannot be 
conveniently examined in court,” as long as the originals or 
duplicates are made available for examination or copying by 
other parties.  Fed. R. Evid. 1006.  
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 Georgiou argues that Koster’s testimony was based on 
specialized knowledge and thus inadmissible from a lay 
witness.  We agree with the District Court’s assessment that 
Koster’s testimony, including comparisons of stock quantities 
and prices did not require prohibited “scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge,” and thus was squarely within 
the scope of Rule 701. (App. 40.)  Koster’s testimony 
provided factual information and summaries of voluminous 
trading records that he had personally reviewed in his 
capacity as an SEC employee and as part of the SEC’s 
investigation of Georgiou.  See SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. 
Supp. 2d 293, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 
admissibility of testimony of SEC witness under Rule 701 
because witness was “simply an SEC employee providing his 
view of the facts as a summary of certain evidence and as an 
aid to the Court,” and that witness’s declaration “was more 
akin to a summary document than an expert analysis”).  
Because Koster “present[ed] testimony and accompanying 
charts concerning the manipulative trading activity charged in 
the indictment . . . [and] explain[ed] the relevance of his 
trading analysis to the other evidence presented in the case,” 
within the scope of Rule 701 and the parties’ pretrial 
stipulation, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting his testimony as a lay witness.  (Gov’t Trial Mem., 
App. 5594.)   
 The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing Koster’s remaining testimony on re-direct because 
Georgiou’s counsel first elicited Koster’s opinion on cross-
examination.  Under the doctrine of curative admissibility, 
i.e., “opening the door,”  “when one party introduces 
inadmissible evidence, the opposing party thereafter may 
introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain 
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the prior evidence.”  Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 
987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing C. McCormick, On 
Evidence § 57 (4th ed. 1992)). 
 2.  Exclusion of evidence pursuant to FRE  
  608(b) 
 Georgiou also argues that the District Court erred in 
prohibiting testimony and extrinsic evidence regarding 
allegations of a post-cooperation fraud perpetrated by 
Waltzer.17  The District Court excluded this evidence as 
collateral and cumulative under Federal Rules of Evidence 
608(b) and 403.  The District Court’s decisions regarding the 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Serafini, 233 F.3d at 768 n. 14 (citing Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 
199).   
 Under Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
“extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific 
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support 
the witness’s character for truthfulness.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
608(b).  Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 authorizes a 
district court to “exclude collateral matters that are likely to 
confuse the issues.”  United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 
919 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court 
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the 
                                                
17 Appellant sought to call a law enforcement agent to testify 
about his investigation of Waltzer on unrelated crimes, and 
seven lay witnesses to testify that they were victims of an 
unrelated fraud perpetrated by Waltzer.  He argued that this 
testimony would show Waltzer’s bias and pattern of fraud.  
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issues . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).  A 
matter is collateral if it is “factually unrelated to [the] case” 
such as an “unrelated criminal investigation.”  Casoni, 950 
F.2d at 919.  Moreover, given the District Court’s “wide 
discretion in limiting cross-examination[,] [a] restriction will 
not constitute reversible error unless it is so severe as to 
constitute a denial of the defendant’s right to confront 
witnesses against him and it is prejudicial to substantial rights 
of the defendant.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 759 
F.2d 1099, 1100 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 Georgiou’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were 
not implicated here, as the record reflects that the District 
Court allowed Appellant to cross-examine Waltzer about his 
alleged criminal acts, and limited further questioning only 
after Waltzer denied engaging in misconduct.  (App. 803-819; 
835-846; 867-872.)  See Casoni, 950 F.2d at 919 (“The 
Supreme Court has said the Constitution’s Confrontation 
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way and to whatever extent, the defense might 
wish.”) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 
(1986)). 
 The District Court’s imposition of a reasonable limit 
on the scope of cross-examination was permissible in order to 
“strike a balance between the constitutionally required 
opportunity to cross-examine and the need to prevent 
repetitive or abusive cross-examination.”  Casoni, 950 F.2d at 
919.  By the time Appellant sought to cross-examine Waltzer 
on his involvement in post-cooperation fraudulent activities, 
the record already contained evidence of Waltzer’s past 
illegal conduct and his cooperation with the Government, all 
of which is directly relevant to Appellant’s theory that 
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Waltzer was biased in favor of the government.  (App. 835-
846; 867-872.)  Indeed, Appellant directly questioned Waltzer 
on whether he was untrustworthy and biased for the 
Government.  Id.  Because “[t]he jury was in possession of 
sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of 
[the witness’s] possible motives for testifying falsely in favor 
of the [G]overnment,” the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding certain extrinsic evidence and limiting 
the cross-examination of Waltzer.  See U.S. v. McNeill, 887 
F.2d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 3. Motion to unseal  
 We reject Georgiou’s argument that the District Court 
erred in denying his motion to unseal.  Georgiou filed the 
motion after filing a notice of appeal with this Court, 
appealing the District Court’s denial of his Motion for 
Reconsideration and New Trial.  “The filing of a notice of 
appeal . . . confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and 
divests the district court of its control over those aspects of 
the case involved in the appeal.”  Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Because the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction at the time Appellant filed 
his motion to unseal, there was no error in denying this 
motion. 
E. Sentencing  
 The District Court sentenced Georgiou to 300 months’ 
imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised 
release, and ordered restitution of $55,832,398, a special 
assessment of $900, and forfeiture of $26,000,000.  Georgiou 
challenges this sentence as procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable, arguing that the District Court erred 
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procedurally in failing to apply Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), to the Guidelines loss 
calculation, resulting in substantive error. 
 Georgiou also challenges the sentence enhancements 
on the grounds that the District Court did not require the 
Government to properly establish the number of victims for a 
six-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (b)(2)(C).  
Georgiou further argues that the District Court erred in adding 
six levels to the Guidelines range due to the dissolution of 
Caledonia and the sophisticated nature of the fraud.  Finally, 
Georgiou asserts that the District Court erred in basing 
restitution on the Guidelines loss calculation, and in its 
imposition of the forfeiture order.   
 The District Court determined that the total actual 
losses amounted to $55,832,398.  This calculation accounted 
for the losses suffered by: (1) the three institutions Georgiou 
defrauded through his use of manipulated stocks, namely, 
Accuvest ($3,613,856), Alliance ($5,890,748), and Caledonia 
($22,000,000) (see App. 5489); (2) Alex Barrotti 
($16,000,000), to whom Georgiou made a false promise to 
cover trading losses for trades made at Georgiou’s direction 
(see App. 5488); and (3) numerous victim shareholders who 
bought HYHY stock during Georgiou’s “pump and dump” 
scheme ($8,327,794).  (See App. 5491, Supp. App. 996.)   
 Based on these figures, Georgiou received a 24-level 
increase to the base offense level of seven pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M) (providing for a 24 point 
enhancement where the loss exceeds $50,000,000).  (App. 
5516-24; App. 5308.) 
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 Our “review of a district court’s decision regarding the 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, including what 
constitutes ‘loss,’ is plenary.”  United States v. Napier, 
273 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Sharma, 190 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review 
factual findings for clear error. Id. (citing Sharma, 190 F.3d at 
229). 
 1. Loss Calculation 
 Georgiou argues that the District Court incorrectly 
calculated the total loss attributable to his offense, resulting in 
a higher total offense level.  He contends that the loss 
calculation contained in the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) was grossly overstated because it ignored the impact 
of market forces on the values of the Target Stocks.  
Georgiou asserts that such an assessment is required under 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, 544 U.S. 336.       
 Although it is undisputed that the District Court did 
not consider the impact of market forces in its loss 
calculation, it was not required to do so.  Dura 
Pharmaceuticals was decided in the context of a civil 
securities fraud class action.  Id. at 341. While some of our 
sister circuits have applied the Dura Pharmaceuticals loss 
calculation in the criminal sentencing context, we have not.  
Thus, there is no basis on which to find the District Court’s 
loss calculation clearly erroneous.  Indeed, the record here 
indicates that the accounts responsible for the losses in the 
Target Stocks were controlled by the Appellant and his 
co-conspirators.  Appellant conceded as much in recorded 
conversations. (See, e.g., App. 702-05, 725-32, Supp. App. 
1101-11.) 
40 
 
 Moreover, assuming arguendo that an error had 
occurred in failing to assess the impact of market forces on 
the Target Stocks, any such error would be harmless.  In 
applying Section 2B1.1(b), courts must use “the greater of the 
actual or intended loss.”  U.S.G.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A).  
During sentencing, the District Court found that Georgiou 
was responsible for intended losses that “far exceeded a 
hundred million [dollars]” based on his scheme involving 
Northern Ethanol.  (App. 5485-86, 5490.)  However, the 
District Court did not consider intended losses in its 
calculation because Georgiou’s total offense level, 45, already 
exceeded the guideline maximum of 43. (App. 5308.) 
Therefore, under either calculation, Georgiou’s total offense 
level would have been in excess of 43. Thus, his sentence was 
not impacted by the District Court’s alleged error.    
 2. Victim Enhancements 
 Georgiou’s challenge to the six-level upward 
adjustment for 250 or more victims under U.S.S.G 
§2B1.1(b)(2)(C) also fails.  The jury found that Appellant 
participated in a “pump and dump” scheme with HYHY, and 
had paid for a mailer on the stock to be sent to seven million 
people.  (Supp. App. 987.)  Koster, the SEC witness, 
identified 1,918 investor accounts that purchased the stock 
during the period of the scheme, each of which lost over 
$1,000.  (App. 5427-29.)  Thus, there were well over 250 
victims, and the District Court’s upward adjustment based on 
number of victims was not clearly erroneous. 
 3. Forfeiture 
 Georgiou did not object—though he had several 
opportunities to do so—to the Court’s imposition of the 
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forfeiture order, which had been submitted to the Court prior 
to sentencing.  Thus, any claims on the basis of this forfeiture 
have been waived.  Furthermore, even absent the waiver, the 
forfeiture is proper under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 
U.S.C. § 2461(c) because the $26,000,000 subject to 
forfeiture “constitutes, or is derived from proceeds traceable 
to the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.”  (See 
App. 1355, 1378-79, 1392-1402, 1415, 1482-96, 1836-38, 
5488-89, Supp. App. 995-96.)  Because Appellant waived his 
objections and because the order was, in fact, proper, there is 
no basis for a finding of clear error with respect to the 
forfeiture.          
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm 
Georgiou’s Judgment of Conviction.  
